International Protection of Human Rights by Ireland, Patricia
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
6-1-1975
International Protection of Human Rights
Patricia Ireland
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Patricia Ireland, International Protection of Human Rights, 7 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 318 (1975)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol7/iss2/4
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
PATRICIA IRELAND*
Few things are as important to international peace and stability as
respect for human rights. When the basic rights and freedoms of a
people are repeatedly violated, they eventually feel compelled to rise
against their oppressors, choosing violence and possible death to an
existence which denies their very humanity. In an interdependent world,
denial of human rights and the resulting possibility of revolt have inter-
national repercussions.
The Second World War brought increased recognition by the world
community that the protection of human rights could not be left to the
discretion of individual nations. But even prior to World War II, inroads
had been made in the doctrines which conflicted with international pro-
tection of human rights. These theoretical stumbling blocks in international
law were the doctrines of legal personality, sovereignty and non-interven-
tion.
The traditional concept of the state as the sole subject of international
law and the sole possessor of sovereignty was not without exceptions.
Individuals too had international duties and could commit offenses against
the law of nations, for example, by piracy.'
Customary rules of war showed a concern for the rights of individuals
as well, making distinctions between combatants and non-combatants and
acknowledging that life should not be taken needlessly.2 The widening of
the concept of international personality in contemporary international
law can be seen in the recognition of the individual as the fundamental
element in the national and international communities and in 'the recogni-
tion of the right of individuals to determine their own political futures,
the right of self-determination. 3
Lauterpacht finds the decisive blow to the barrier between the indivi-
dual and international law in the 1928 Advisory Opinion of the Permanent
*J.D., University of Miami; Assistant Editor, Lawyer of the Americas.
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Court of International Justice on the Jurisdiction of the Courts o/ Danzig.4
That case held that states could by international agreement make the
individual the subject of international rights and duties enforceable at
the individual's instance by national courts.5
The concepts of absolute sovereignty and independence of states were
eroded by doctrines of state responsibility and humanitarian intervention.
The customary doctrine of state responsibility allows interposition by a
nation on behalf of its citizens abroad when they are denied a right
recognized by civilized nations or secured to them by an international
agreement. Humanitarian intervention was justified when morality de-
manded a state step into another's territory to stop cruel and oppressive
treatment of its inhabitants.
The further evolution of the position of the individual and of state
sovereignty in international law can be seen in the practice of the various
supranational institutions for the protection of human rights.
United Nations
Individual communications alleging violations of human rights are
received by the United Nations. A list of these and other communications
is forwarded to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities by the Secretary General along with any replies
received from the governments concerned.
The Sub-Commission agreed in 1971 on the admissibility of com-
plaints from individuals or groups of individuals who could reasonably
be presumed to have been victims of or to have had direct and reliable
knowledge of violations of human rights.6 The Sub-Commission may re-
quest the text of the original complaint to study in addition to the govern-
ment replies and any other relevant information.
If a particular situation appears to reveal a consistent pattern of gross
and reliably attested violation of human rights, the Sub-Commission refers
it to the Commission on Human Rights. 7
In 1967, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights reversed its position
of twenty years earlier by deciding that it did have power to take action
in regard to complaints concerning human rights. That year it established
a group of experts to investigate charges of torture and inhumane treat-
ment of prisoners in South Africa.s
In addition to such action, the Commission makes reports and recom-
mendations to the Economic and Social Council. Recommendations from
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this Council are made to the General Assembly, one of whose functions is
"assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms."9
Under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, states may agree to allow the Human Rights Committee to receive
from individuals communications alleging violations of the rights set forth
in the Covenant. The Commission would then notify the state involved
which would have six months to submit a written explanation and a
statement of any remedies which it had provided.10 Neither the Covenant
nor the Optional Protocol, both approved by the General Assembly in
1966, are yet in force.
Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter provides that nothing in
the Charter shall authorize the U.N. to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. In the Dumbarton
Oaks Proposal, this provision had been included in the section on pacific
settlement of disputes. It was shifted in the Charter to be included among
the Organization's Principles and thus became a limitation on the entire
organization rather than on the Security Council alone.11
In 1946, Art. 2(7) was the basis for the objection by the Union of
South Africa to the General Assembly's consideration of South Africa's
treatment of Indians in its country. The Indian delegation had charged
that restrictions on the civil, political and economic rights of Indians in
South Africa was contrary to the objectives of the Charter and in violation
of the Capetown Agreement between the two countries. Since the Indians
were South African citizens, the Union of South Africa claimed that under
Art. 2(7) the matter was outside the competence of the U.N.
The resolution adopted by the General Assembly noted that relations
between the two states had been impaired and were likely to be further
impaired unless a satisfactory settlement was reached. It expressed the
opinion that South African treatment of Indians should conform to ob-
ligations in force between the two governments and to relevant provisions•
of the Charter. It also requested the two governments to make reports at
the next session.12
The extent to which U.N. recognition of the danger posed to inter.
national peace and security by denial of human rights has come to out-
weigh the doctrine of non-intervention in domestic affairs can be seen in
its consideration of apartheid in South Africa and forced labor in East
Europe. In 1952 in the General Assembly, fifty-eight of sixty members
voted for one or both of the investigations into these matters which a
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century earlier would have been considered to fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the states involved. Only South Africa itself and Argentina
voted for neither. 13
Europe
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, which entered into force on Sept. 3, 1953, made the right of
individual petition against a state conditional. Twelve of the fifteen states
which signed the Convention have made the necessary separate declaration
recognizing the jurisdiction of the European Commission on Human Rights
to hear private complaints against them. These same states have also ac-
cepted the optional compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of
Human Rights.
Cases may be referred to the Court only after the Commission has
made a preliminary ruling of admissibility and has acknowledged failure
to reach a settlement. The referral may be made by the Commission, the
state whose national is the alleged victim, the state complained against or
the state which referred the case to the Commission. Thus, while individ-
uals have no direct standing in the Court, they were given indirect access
for the first time to an international judicial body for alleged violations
of their human rights by the European system.
The European willingness to relinquish a portion of their sovereignty
to a supranational organization resulted in part from the temper of the
times in which the Convention was written. The European countries
sought unity in response to the threat from Stalinist Russia and the
memory of Nazi Germany. They felt that the first step toward dictatorship
was the gradual suppression of human rights. If these rights were assured,
democracy would be secure.14
Willingness to submit to the jurisdiction of an international body was
also the result of the belief by the European countries that the body would
be enforcing ideals which were part of their common heritage. They felt
that their institutions were already in conformity with the requirements
of the Convention or were willing to modify those that were not.ls
The Americas
The 1960 Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights was not originally intended to give the Commission competence to
act on complaints by individuals.1 6 However, the Commission was entitled
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to adopt its own rules of procedure and from the beginning it interpreted
its power under Art. 9 to prepare studies and reports on human rights
and to secure information from governments on the measures adopted as
including the power to receive individual communications as information
and to request either further information regarding the complaint or
permission to make an on the spot investigation.
The Commission's power to make recommendations to individual
governments was also not clear initially. Art. 9 of its statute only authorized
the Commission "[t]o make recommendations to the governments of
member states in general ... for the adoption of progressive measures in
favor of human rights . . ." [emphasis added]. Nevertheless, if the
charges were verified, the Commission made recommendations to the
particular government involved. In 1965, the Second Special Inter-
American Conference gave official approval to these practices. 17
The Commission in its capacity as an advisory body on human rights
to the OAS makes annual reports to the Organization. These reports include
observations on communications received and on unsatisfactory responses
of governments to requests or recommendations. Progress by members in
the field of human rights and areas in which measures should be taken
for more effective protection of these rights are also included.
In 1966 the Commission requested annual reports from every govern-
ment on the effective exercise of human rights, on suspensions of human
rights and the reasons therefore and on measures taken to adapt internal
legislation to the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.18
The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (which is not yet
in force) goes further than the U.N. Covenants or the European Conven-
tion in its treatment of individual complaints. The right of individual
petition against a state which has ratified will be automatic when the
Convention enters into force. Interstate complaints, however, may not be
received until a state has separately declared its recognition of the Com-
mission's jurisdiction to hear them. Thomas Buergenthal feels that this
reversal of the traditional formula should be more acceptable to the
governments involved. For while individual complaints may be more
frequent than interstate, they also have fewer political repercussions, are
less unpredictable and generate less public attention.19
The doctrine of non-intervention has always been particularly strong
in Latin America. These countries have feared intervention, first from
European creditor states in the early nineteenth century, later from the
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United States. The intense concern with guarding their sovereignty
hindered the development of any program for international protection of
human rights among the American states. In 1945, the majority of gove-
ernments in Latin America rejected Uruguayan Foreign Minister Rodriguez
Larreta's proposal for collective action in defense of democracy and human
rights against domestic tyranny as unacceptable collective intervention.
2 0
The 1948 Charter of the OAS incorporated absolute non-intervention
in Art. 15-17. Article 15 prohibits all forms of intervention, direct or
indirect, for any reason by a state or group of states. Under Art. 16
coercive measures of any kind, whether political or economic are forbidden.
Absolute inviolability of a state's territory is guaranteed by Art. 17
which prohibits even temporary military intervention or any measure of
force taken by another state directly or indirectly on any ground.
Ironically, violations of the doctrine of non-intervention have been
the impetus for more recent concern with human rights in the Inter-
American system. In 1959, the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs met in Santiago, Chile, to consider political tensions
in the Caribbean. From its consideration of the Trujillo regime in general
and of the charges that it had engaged in terrorist activities in Venezuela
in particular, the Meeting was led to consideration of the disruptive effects
violations of human rights might have on peace in the Americas.
After concluding that American peace could only be effective in so
far as human rights, fundamental freedoms and the exercise of representa-
tive democracy were realities in each member state, the Meeting asked the
Inter-American Council of Jurists to prepare a draft Inter-American Con-
vention on Human Rights and an instrument creating an Inter-American
Court for the Protection of Human Rights. An Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights was created by the Meeting to promote respect for
human rights and to develop an awareness of human rights among the
peoples of the Americas.2
1
Again in 1965, a violation of the doctrine of non-intervention was
the occasion for expansion of the protection of human rights in the
Americas. On April 28, President Johnson responded to an urgent request
from U.S. Ambassador Bennet for U.S. armed forces to be sent to the
Dominican Republic to protect the lives of Americans and other foreigners
during an uprising there.
22
The Tenth Meeting of Consultation was convened at the request of
Chile to consider the struggle in the Dominican Republic. Most of the
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states present disapproved of the unilateral intervention by the United
States as a violation of the OAS Charter and only agreed to inter-
nationalize the force (also a violation of the Charter) as the lesser of two
evils. (Although the U.S. has pressed for creation of a permanent Inter-
American force, subsequent revision of the Charter has not provided for
one.) 23
The purpose of the Inter-American force in the Dominican Republic
was to be to maintain the security of the inhabitants and the inviolability
of human rights and to. establish an atmosphere of peace and conciliation
which would permit functioning of democratic institutions. At the request
of the Secretary General, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights also went to the Dominican Republic to help.24
In its work in the Dominican Republic, the Commission clearly went
beyond its statutory powers to study, report and recommend. It secured
the agreement of both factions to respect the principles of the American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and inspected places of
detention of both factions; it arranged neutral zones of refuge and
permission for some political figures to leave the country; and it gained
permission for the unloading of food and medicine from ships.
The Second Special Inter-American Conference subsequently approved
this expanded role of the Commission by commending it for its past
service. This Conference also explicitly authorized the Commission's prac-
tice of receiving individual complaints, acting on those charging violations
of basic rights and making recommendations to the particular state
involved. 25
The Commission carried on similar activities in 1969 when El Salva-
dor and Honduras both invited it to investigate charges of violation of
human rights during the so-called Soccer War.26
These events show. the development of inter-American institutions for
protection of human rights to be in fact an aspect of their adherence to
the concept of non-intervention. In 1945, the Inter-American. Conference
on Problems of War and Peace expressed its preference for international
protection of human rights to the traditional doctrine of state responsibility
and the misuse of diplomatic protection of citizens abroad.
27
In the same way, in the Dominican Republic the OAS preferred
collective intervention in the name of human rights to unilateral inter-
vention by the United States.
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The issue of sovereignty may be one factor favoring the establishment
of regional instead of global organizations to protect human rights. States
may be more willing to submit to a supranational organization composed
of neighboring countries with close ideological and economic ties. Perhaps
voluntary submission to effective regional organizations will be an inter-
mediate step in the development of eventual national willingness to grant
a global organization the necessary power to effectively protect human
rights.
In addition to increasing the probability that it will be empowered to
act, the common interests and ideals within a regional organization may
make it more likely to be able to reach concensus as to what action should
be taken in a particular situation.
A comparison of the various international instruments for the pro-
tection of human rights will be helpful in evaluating the potential effec-
tiveness of the U.N., European and American systems.
U.N. Documents
Under Art. 1 and 55 of the U.N. Charter, one of the main purposes
and duties of the organization is to promote respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language
or religion. Each member state pledges under Art. 56 to take joint and
separate action to achieve these purposes.
In a recent decision, the International Court of Justice made clear
its view that the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter are legal
obligations of the member states.28 A Canadian court has found conflict
with the human rights provisions of the Charter to be an indication of
violation of public policy.29 However, the California Supreme Court
specifically rejected the view that the Charter has become the supreme
law of the land, citing a lack of mandatory quality and definiteness as
proof of a lack of intent to create enforceable rights.30
Panama and other Latin American countries had proposed inclusion
of a hill of human rights in the U.N. Charter itself. 31 Although this
proposal was not adopted, Art. 68 of the Charter made mandatory
the establishment of a commission for the promotion of human rights-
the only functional commission expressly provided for in the Charter. 32
In 1946, when the Commission on Human Rights was established,
the first item on its agenda was the preparation of an international bill
of rights. The Commission's recommendation, approved by the General
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Assembly in 1948, was for this bill of rights to consist of a declaration
of human rights, one or more conventions and the necessary means of
implementation. The first step was taken when the General Assembly
passed a resolution adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
on Dec. 10, 1948.53
The U.S. representative to the General Assembly stated at the time
that the declaration was not a treaty or an international agreement and
that it was not a statement of law or legal obligation. 34 But in 1949 in
the Russian Wives case, the General Assembly found the Soviet Union
guilty of violating the Charter by taking action contrary to Art. 13 and
16 of the Universal Declaration. 5
Judge Ammoun in his separate opinion in the Barcelona Traction
Case noted a trend in legal writings to consider declarations of the General
Assembly as at least subsidiary sources of law and perhaps as the first
step in the formation of a customary law binding on the states.1 6
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights were
adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 16, 1966. The thirty-five
ratifications necessary for entry into force have not yet been received.
European Documents
The Statute of the Council of Europe includes the maintenance of
human rights not only in the general affirmations of faith, but also
among the objectives of the Council. Acceptance of the principle is a
condition of membership. The European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, the first treaty of the Council of Europe,
entered into force on September 3, 1953. Four Protocols to the Convention
have also come into effect and a fifth has been concluded. Sixteen mem-
bers of the Council of Europe have ratified the Convention, although
Greece denounced its ratification in 1969. The Convention provides for
a Commission on Human Rights and for the only Human Rights Court
currently in operation. 37
American Documents
Although the Charter of the Organization of American States, adopted
in 1948 affirms the fundamental rights of the individual without distinc-
tion based on race, nationality, creed or sex, and obliges member states
to respect human rights, it makes no provision for the promotion or
protection of these rights.
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The Ninth International Conference of American States adopted the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in 1949. This
was the first international declaration on human rights.38 In addition to
civil and political rights, it formulates broad economic and social rights
which, while appropriate in a non-binding declaration, must be viewed
as long term goals. The inclusion of the duties of man is a unique
feature of the American Declaration.
The Ninth Conference also recommended that the Inter-American
Juridical Committee prepare a draft statute for an Inter-American Human
Rights Court, but the draft was not even scheduled for study by a
ministerial conference for five years. Despite the existence of the American
Declaration, the Committee reported that there was not a sufficient body
of positive law to serve as the basis of such a statute. 39
The next positive action taken toward the establishment of an in-
stitutional structure for protection of human rights in the Americas was
taken in 1959 when the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs requested the Inter-American Council of Jurists to draft
an Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and to prepare an
agreement for an Inter-American Court. The OAS Council was asked
to prepare a statute for an Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights to promote the rights listed in the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man.
The draft convention prepared by the Council of Jurists was not
considered by the OAS until 1965 when the Second Special Inter-
American Conference referred it to the OAS Council along with drafts
prepared by Uruguay and Chile. The Council was given one year in
which to receive the views of interested parties and to complete revision
of the draft.40
The Council's Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs did not
begin work on the revised draft convention until May, 1967, more than
a year after the Council was supposed to have completed its revision.41
The American Convention was finally adopted in 1969 at the Inter-
American Specialized Conference on Human Rights. Twelve of the nine-
teen countries present signed the Convention.42 Of the eleven ratifications
required for entry into force, only two, those of Costa Rica and Venezuela,
have been received.43
The U.S., Mexico, Argentina and Brazil were among the states
which did not sign the Convention. Argentina and Brazil had both main-
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tained that work on the regional convention should be discontinued when
the American states had been asked by the OAS Council in 1967 whether
they would wish to establish a single universal system of regulation of
human rights under the U.N. Covenants or to establish co-existing global
and regional conventions. Although eight other states had agreed with
the proposition of institutional means of protection at both levels, many of
these states did not actively support a separate regional agreement on
substantive principles. Among those who did support preparation of a
regional convention was the United States.44 However, when the time
came to sign the Convention, the United States declined, expressing the
belief that the question of individual rights is largely within the jurisdic-
tion of the individual states in the U.S.
Substantive Provisions ol the Documents
The U.N. Covenants and the European and American Conventions
provide immediate, concrete protection only to civil and political rights.
Economic, social and cultural rights are treated as future goals to be
attained by progressive development.
The European Convention, the only one currently in force, originally
covered thirteen rights. Five more rights were added by the four Protocols.
Luini del Russo groups the rights protected into the following seven
classes:
(1) the right to life and physical integrity which covers the pro-
hibitions of torture, inhumane treatment and slavery; (2) the right to
personal liberty and security under civil and criminal due process;
(3) the right to privacy and family life; (4) the right to intellectual
freedoms- thought, conscience, religion and expression; (5) the right
to peaceful assembly and association, to join a trade union and to vote
in free political elections; (6) the right to property; (7) the freedom to
travel within and without the national boundary, freedom from deporta-
tion or exclusion from national territory.45 These basic rights are also
protected under the U.N. and American documents.
The U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American
Convention on Human Rights include some rights in common which
are excluded from the European Convention. Both'include the right to a
juridical personality (American Art. 3; U.N. Art. 16), the right to
equality before the law (American Art. 24; U.N. Art. 25), and in
criminal proceedings, the right to appeal, the privilege against self-
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incrimination and the prohibition of double jeopardy (American Art. 8;
U.N. Art. 14). Both also include a statement that the essential aim of
imprisonment shall be reform and social rehabilitation of the prisoner
[American Art. 5(2) ; U.N. Art. 10(3)].
A unique guarantee of the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights is the right of all peoples to self-determination and to free disposal
of their natural resources for their own means. Art. 1. The U.N. is also
alone in its prohibition of propaganda for war and of advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred which would incite discrimination, hostility
or violence. Art. 20. The Covenant has been criticized for its lack of pro-
tection of property rights and for a lack of provision for reservations,
both of which are provided by the American and European Conventions.46
The American Convention on Human Rights extends protection to
twenty-three general categories of rights. Several of the rights guaranteed
are unique to the American Convention. These include the right of every
person to a name (Art. 18) and. a nationality (Art. 20). The U.N. Covenant
guarantees these rights only to children. The right of political asylum
(Art. 22) and the right of reply using the same means of communication
to inaccurate or offensive statements (Art. 14) are also found only in
the American Convention.
The basic rights common to the various agreements are more detailed
and extensive in the American Convention. For example, the right to
life applies from the moment of conception. Art. 4(1). Art. 4(2) on
the death penalty goes beyond the usual restriction of its use only for
the most serious crimes and pursuant to final judgment of a competent
court. It also provides that capital punishment shall not be extended to
crimes to which it does not currently apply and that it shall not be re-
instated in countries which have abolished it. Art. 4(2), 4(3).
Such expressions of Latin American idealism may hinder ratification
of the American Convention. The inclusion of so many extensive rights
may reflect recognition of a great need for protection in the Americas.
However, to the extent that the Convention attempts to create new rights
rather than to compile existing ones, the governments will be less likely
to accept it.47
It has been suggested that the Convention could still be useful as a
source of law even if unratified.48 The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights is charged with promoting and protecting human rights as
set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
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However, that Declaration proclaims very general principles which
Buergenthal finds ill-suited to adjudicatory purposes. He suggests that
the Commission may be able to refer to the Convention as a gloss on the
Declaration to give precision and normative content to it.
Even this use of the American Convention would e ineffective to
the extent that it failed to take into consideration the nature of law.
Rules imposed from without a society may not be law, but mere formal.
ism. It is especially true for international law, whose sanctions are limited
to publicity of violations, economic coercion or war, that law must
emanate from behavior. International law must be based on recognition
by nations that they are bound by it and that obedience is essential to
the realization of nations' self-interest in a world community.4 9 Any use
of the American Convention will be effective only in those countries
which have reached this level of political maturity.
The question of U.S. ratification of either the American Convention
or the U.N. Covenant~raises some constitutional controversy, a detailed
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, one of
the basic constitutional questions, whether human rights is a proper
subject of an international agreement, must be mentioned.
The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Peace and
Law through the U.N. claims that the constitutional test of whether a
matter is a proper subject for a treaty is whether it is of a domestic
nature or is of international concern. The Committee concludes that the
relationship between a state and its citizens is domestic.5 0 Even using
the Committee's test, the protection of human rights can better be viewed
as an international concern and therefore as a proper subject for treaty.
The disturbance which may start within a country due to the suppression
of human rights seldom stays within its borders.
The Counsel for the ABA Section on International and Comparative
Law rejects the Standing Committee's test. He finds the test in Asakura v.
Seatde,51 which held that the treaty power extends to all proper subjects
of negotiation. If the subject of a treaty is properly a matter for interna-
tional negotiation, the treaty is constitutional even though the subject
matter is also domestic.52
Even if the constitutional issues are resolved in favor of ratification,
certain of the substantive provisions of the two instruments will be
problematical for the United States.
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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has
no provision for reservations, conflicts with the United States' First
Amendment guarantee of free speech by prohibiting propaganda for war
and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred which would incite
to discrimination or hostility. (Such advocacy is also prohibited if it
would incite to violence, but this limitation is often put on freedom of
expression in the United States in the interest of preserving public order
and safety.)
Buergenthal has suggested that the requirement that imprisonment
be essentially for reform and social rehabilitation of the prisoner, found
in both the U.N. and American documents, might be interpreted as out-
lawing life sentences."
Other objections to the substantive provisions of the American Con-
vention can be made. The -application of the right to life from the moment
of conception is contrary to current United States's law and would cause
considerable controversy here' S4 The right to reply to inaccurate or
offensive statements using the same means of communication has also
been rejected by the United States Supreme Court as unconstitutional.5 5
Recent legislation in more than half of the states attempting to formulate
a constitutional death penalty would conflict with the Convention's
prohibition of reinstatement of capital punishment in those countries
which have abolished it.
The means of implementing the guarantees found in the conventions
must also be considered.
The Inter-American Convention provides for a Commission and a
Court as the means of protection of the rights prescribed. The Inter-
American Commission for Human Rights would be empowered to con.
sider complaints against any country party to the convention from in-
dividuals, groups and legal non-governmental entities, and, in the case
of a complaint against a state which had specially declared recognition
of the Commission's competence to do so, from other states parties to
the convention. Only when effective domestic remedies had been exhausted
would a petition be admissible. It would have to be filed within six months
of notification of final domestic judgment and it could not be concerned
with a subject pending in another international proceeding or which was
substantially the same as one previously considered by an international
organization. Art. 44-47.
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The Commission would gather information, make an investigation
and attempt to promote a friendly settlement of the matter. If a settle-
ment were reached, the Commission would prepare a report of the facts
and the solution for the petitioners and the states parties. If there had
been no settlement, the Commission's report would contain a statement
of the facts and the Commission's conclusions and would -be transmitted
only to the states concerned who would not be at liberty to publish it.
The states parties or the Commission could then submit the case to the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights if the state concerned had
recognized the jurisdiction of the Court either for purposes of the particular
case or for all cases.
If within three months the case were not submitted to the Court
or settled, the majority of the Commission could set forth an opinion
and conclusion on the matter, make recommendations and prescribe a
period within which the state should remedy the situation. After the
prescribed period, a majority vote of the Commission would decide
whether a state had taken adequate measures and whether to publish
its report. Art. 48-51.
If the case were submitted to the Court and it found a violation of
a protected right or freedom, the Court could rule that the situation be
remedied and that the injured party be fairly compensated. In cases of
extreme gravity, to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court could
adopt the necessary provisional measures. The Court would also be
authorized to give advisory opinions on the request of member states
or of OAS organs. Art. 61-65.
The U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights relies on a Human
Rights Committee and an ad hoc Conciliation Commission to provide
protection of the rights listed in it. The Committee would be able to
consider communications concerning states which had declared recognition
of its competence to do so only if the communication were submitted by
a state which had made a similar declaration. Like the American Con-
vention, the Covenant requires that domestic remedies have been
exhausted. The Committee's main duty would be to make available its
good offices with a view to the friendly solution of the matter. Art. 41.
The Conciliation Commission would be appointed by the Committee
with the prior consent of the states if no solution had been found within
twelve months. It too would make available its good offices and submit
a report to the Committee for communication to the states concerned
within twelve months. If no solution had been reached during that time,
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the report would consist of the Commission's findings of fact and its views
on the possibilities of an amicable solution of the matter.
Arguments can be made favoring either a commission or a court as
the final institution for implementation of human rights agreements. Jos6
Cabranes has suggested that Latin American history, the remains of
American international law of non-intervention and the constitutional in-
hibitions of the United States may make it necessary to rely on the non-
judicial and essentially non-political efforts of an agency like the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights."6
However, Cabranes acknowledges that political realities may not
permit the Commission to operate even-handedly. In the past the Com-
mission has received complaints from within the United States, but has
hesitated to investigate them. The United States has been accused of
reluctance to accept any international responsibility for alleged violation
of the rights of its inhabitants. In view of this attitude, the Commission
may feel that an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States
would impair its future usefulness.S7
To promote acceptance of the obligatory nature of an international
law of human rights and to make the sanction of publicity more effective,
Luis Kutner and others favor establishment of international tribunals.
The creation of a common understanding of the obligation is felt by
Kutner to be more easily attained by an institution that is both a focal
point for debate and an authoritative source of decisions."8 The decisions
of a court would be made publicly and would perhaps be freer from
political pressure which might have a significant influence on the out.
come of confidential negotiations under a commission.
The problem of the promptness of the determination of individual
rights under a convention is also raised by Kutner. He favors the in-
troduction of an international writ of habeas corpus to ensure prompt,
effective determination in each instance. The proposed international writ
of habeas corpus could be used to obtain not only the release of persons
illegally detained by the authorities, but also of persons held illegally
in private custody or those no longer in actual custody but who are
under the power of control of the respondent. Thus, Kutner sees this
writ as applicable against any government that had or exerted physical
domination over the race or persons of another government. 59
A similar uniform precedural device to ensure judicial remedy for
the violation of human rights in Latin America has been proposed by
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Pedro Pablo Camargo. He suggests formulation of a model amparo
similar to that in Mexico which may be used as a synonym for habeas
corpus, as a means for protecting human rights recognized by the con-
stitution and as a device for questioning the constitutionality of laws.60
Whether implementation is primarily by a court or a commission,
the participation and cooperation of the United States will be essential
to the success of an international system for the protection of human
rights, especially within the Americas. Other nations would feel that a
lack of confidence in their national institutions was implied if they were
asked to give a portion of their sovereignty to such a system without the
United States doing the same.
For an international system of protection of human rights to be
effective, it seems necessary for the United States to abandon its tradi-
tional position and to set an example by opening itself to the investigations
of an international commission or the adjudication of an international
court and to welcome the opportunity to correct situations which may be
found to violate human rights.
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